Unconstructive Ambiguity in the Durban Climate Deal of COP 17 / CMP 7 by Moncel, Remi
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 12
Issue 2 Winter 2012: Climate Law Reporter Article 3
Unconstructive Ambiguity in the Durban Climate
Deal of COP 17 / CMP 7
Remi Moncel
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moncel, Remi. "Unconstructive Ambiguity in the Durban Climate Deal of COP 17 / CMP 7." Sustainable Development Law & Policy
12, no. 2 (2012): 6-11, 52-56.
6 SuStainable Development law & policy
unConstRuCtive ambiguity in the duRban 
Climate deal of Cop 17 / Cmp 7
by Remi Moncel*
InTroducTIon
“The Durban conference in December 2011 marked 
a breakthrough in international efforts to combat climate 
change.”1 It is in these terms that the European Commission 
(“EU”) Commissioner Connie Hedegaard described the 17th 
Conference of the Parties (“COP 17”) to the United Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”) 
and the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“CMP 7”), 
which took place this past winter in South Africa.2
In Durban, governments agreed to a package composed of 
three main elements: 1) a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol 
with a second round of quantified mitigation commitments to 
be defined for a subset of Annex I countries;3 2) operational 
decisions implementing the 2010 Cancun Agreements;4 and 
3) the launch of a process for a new international agreement 
by 2015 applicable to all Parties.5 The Durban Package is the 
latest development in the climate regime: the constellation of 
international, national and sub-national institutions and actors 
with capacity, expertise and authority to address climate change. 
While some commentators expressed skepticism on this out-
come,6 the dominant view appears to be one of cautious – and at 
times enthusiastic – optimism, similar to the opinion expressed 
by Commissioner Hedegaard.7
However, several fundamental political and technical ques-
tions were left unanswered in Durban.8 Because of disagreements, 
negotiators delayed decisions or used ambiguous wording to 
express political will.9 Chief among these ambiguous phrases is 
“agreed outcome with legal force,” a phrase that seemed to serve 
as a compromise for the legal form of a future climate agree-
ment during the final hours of the talks.10 This article examines 
this emblematic formulation and other important considerations 
beyond legal form that were left unanswered or ambiguous.
Scholars have argued that regimes can evolve gradually 
and that small steps can have significant effects over time.11 
Borrowing the approach former U.S. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, compromises on language may be a manifestation of 
“constructive ambiguity”12 that would allow the climate regime 
to grow stronger incrementally.13 While recognizing the benefits 
of an incremental approach, it is worth considering what growth 
is sufficient for the climate regime to be effective and whether 
such a threshold was secured in Durban. There is a risk that 
the Durban outcome in fact yielded unconstructive ambiguity 
in the sense that, by avoiding difficult, time-sensitive political 
questions today, negotiators may have missed the narrow win-
dow of opportunity that science suggests remains for limiting a 
rise in global average temperature to two degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels.14 Thus, governments’ ambiguity may have 
de facto, and perhaps inadvertently, locked the world into a high 
emissions trajectory.
In that context, the purpose of this article is to evaluate the 
Durban outcome in terms of its ability to set the climate change 
regime on a path to limit the global average temperature rise to 
two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.15 Comprehensive 
descriptions of the outcome of the conference have been written 
elsewhere. Instead, this article focuses on some of the most 
central provisions of a Durban-created future international cli-
mate agreement intended to facilitate international cooperation 
in meeting scientifically driven mitigation goals.16 Specifically, 
a review of key agreement provisions finds that, while it is pre-
mature to cast a definitive judgment on the success of the Durban 
conference, the adequacy of a global response to climate change 
remains unclear and presents cause for concern.
The article assesses three of the key issues under negotiation 
in Durban as an illustration of the phenomenon of unconstructive 
ambiguity: the legal form of a future agreement; national and 
global mitigation commitments; and equity. In the conclusion, the 
possible causes and implications of this outcome are discussed.
The LegaL Form oF a  
FuTure cLImaTe agreemenT
The question of the legal form for a future climate agree-
ment to complement or replace the Kyoto Protocol was central 
in the Durban negotiations in 2011.17 Views diverge among 
scholars and advocates on whether voluntary or legally binding 
commitments lead to greater ambition and implementation of 
international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions by national governments.18 The benefits of a legally-
binding international agreement may include greater legal 
certainty, increased incentives for domestic implementation and 
compliance, opportunities for legal challenges, and additional 
leverage for civil society to hold their governments account-
able.19 By contrast, others argue that a voluntary framework 
would lead to greater participation and more ambitious goals.20
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In some ways, the Durban conference defied the odds with 
a decision that signals a move towards a “top-down”21 climate 
regime after many had assumed that the regime would take a 
“bottom-up” form in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Accord22 
and the Cancun Agreements.23 Several elements of the Durban 
outcome suggest a possible shift towards a more inclusive mul-
tilateral legal framework. However, ambiguous compromises in 
Durban limit the ability to know with certainty the structure of 
the future climate regime.
a Reinvestment in multilateRalism
The Durban Package24 included an agreement to continue 
the Kyoto Protocol after its first commitment period, which ends 
in 2012.25 The EU has agreed to a second commitment period.26 
Although the end date of this second commitment period remains 
to be negotiated,27 a new set of mitigation commitments by the 
EU, and possibly other developed countries such as Norway, 
Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, will begin on January 
1, 2013.28 Beyond 2012, however, critics correctly point out that, 
given the absence of involvement in this process from other devel-
oped countries like the United States, Canada, Russia, and Japan, 
and quantified commitments from developing countries, the Kyoto 
Protocol will only include commitments from countries repre-
senting at most fifteen to sixteen percent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions,29 and is therefore inadequate.30 However, there 
are several benefits to the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol. It 
preserves certain multilateral rules and institutions that can serve 
as models for the new climate agreement proposed for adoption 
by 2015, such as accounting rules, a compliance mechanism, 
emissions trading systems, and the Adaptation Fund.31 Secondly, 
the EU restored some of the trust lost among countries by fulfill-
ing a major demand of developing countries: the continuation of 
the Kyoto Protocol as a necessary condition for enhanced global 
action in any post-2012 climate regime.32
COP 17 also established the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (“AWG-DPEA”) with a 
view toward developing “a protocol, another legal instrument, 
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC 
applicable to all Parties.”33 This agreement is planned to be 
negotiated over the coming three years, to be adopted at COP 
21 in 2015, and to “come into effect and be implemented from 
2020.”34 The agreement’s significance should not be underes-
timated. Although several countries in the months and years 
preceding COP 17 had expressed a desire to establish a single 
legal agreement applicable to all countries,35 many developing 
countries maintained that the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities required that 
developed countries be legally bound to reduce emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol or an equivalent legal instrument that did not 
include similar commitments from developing countries.36 Other 
countries, particularly the U.S., argued throughout 2011, and 
until the end of the conference, that the politics were not right 
for adopting such a roadmap.37 The wording of Paragraph 2 of 
the decision establishing the Durban Platform creates a window 
of opportunity in 2015 to adopt a legally binding instrument, 
such as new protocol under the Convention or an amendment 
to the Convention.38 In fact, several developed and developing 
countries, as well as observers, interpret the Durban outcome as 
presaging a new legally binding instrument.39 In addition, in the 
fall of 2011 and during the negotiations in Durban, the EU made 
clear that it would agree to a second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol only if other countries adopted a roadmap toward 
a universal, legally binding agreement under the Convention 
applicable to all Parties.40
Remaining ambiguities on legal foRm
Despite the noteworthy expressed willingness by some 
Parties to be bound by a common legal instrument beginning 
in 2020, the ambiguity of the carefully crafted phrase “agreed 
outcome with legal force” continues to hide diverging views 
about the legal form of this future agreement and the commit-
ments it will contain. The terms “a protocol” and “another legal 
instrument” have a clear precedent in international climate law 
as both terms were used separately in the 1995 Berlin Mandate 
that led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.41 The 
two terms convey the notion that the agreement to be negotiated 
will have a legally binding form.42 By contrast, the novel phrase 
“agreed outcome with legal force” has not been used in interna-
tional climate law43 and appears to be new to international law as 
well.44 Since the meaning of the phrase is uncertain, the Durban 
outcome does not necessarily imply that the agreement set to be 
adopted in 2015 will be legally binding.
The formulation, “agreed outcome with legal force,” was the 
result of a compromise brokered by the EU and India.45 While 
other countries also expressed views on this question, these two 
actors emerged in the final hours as the crucial deal makers.46 
The EU’s satisfaction was essential to secure a second commit-
ment period to the Kyoto Protocol for developed countries.47 
India’s consent was necessary because it appeared to be the most 
steadfast in its refusal to commit to adopting an agreement of a 
legally binding nature in 2015.48 This phrase allowed EU and 
India to return home without having crossed any “red lines.”49 
In a speech to the Indian Parliament after COP 17, Minister of 
State for Environment and Forests Jayanthi Natarajan conveyed 
that India continues to oppose a legally binding agreement 
that includes commitments for India.50 She noted that “[s]ome 
parties led, in particular, by the EU pressed for a form of agree-
ment that should be legally binding on all Parties.”51 She added 
that “India cannot agree to a legally binding agreement for emis-
sions reduction at this stage of our development” and that “the 
[Durban] decision allows India the necessary flexibility over 
the choice of appropriate legal form to be decided in future.”52 
The Minister’s insistence on wording that is different from 
“protocol” and “another legal instrument” suggests that she 
attributed a different meaning to the phrase “agreed out-
come with legal force.”53 Meanwhile, Commissioner Connie 
Hedegaard suggested that neither the EU nor India had over-
stepped its position when she stated that “[w]hile protecting our 
respective interests, we gave a bit of ground to get a good result 
for the global community.” 54
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Under the Durban decision, India seems to interpret a non-
binding agreement, suggesting that the legal form of a future 
agreement actually remains to be negotiated. In the words of the 
Indian Minister:
The post 2020 arrangements, when finalized, may 
include some aspirational CoP decisions, binding CoP 
decisions, setting up of new institutions and bodies, and 
new protocols or other legal instruments as necessary 
to implement the decisions covering various issues 
with various degrees of bindingness as per domestic or 
international provisions of law under the Convention.55
Despite India’s protest, it may be the case that the nation’s 
concerns and priorities can be integrated into a legally binding 
agreement in 2015. India’s priority is essentially one of equity 
and its ability to develop.56 The way forward may lie in the 
design of a legally binding agreement that differentiates between 
developed and developing countries in the content of post-2020 
commitments and allows India to articulate commitments con-
sistent with its development and poverty eradication goals.
Another unresolved issue is the legal form of the commit-
ments that countries will implement post 2020.57 The Durban 
decision establishing the AWG-DPEA does not specify the legal 
form of the commitments that countries will take.58 Rather, it 
merely notes that the new process “shall raise the level of ambi-
tion” and focus in part on “mitigation.”59 Even so, it is important 
to note that not all legally binding agreements contain legally 
binding commitments.60 For example, the UNFCCC is a legally 
binding agreement whose commitments are not expressed in 
specific and obligatory terms.61 Conversely, the Kyoto Protocol 
is a legally binding agreement with legally binding mitiga-
tion commitments applicable to developed countries but not 
developing countries, even though developing countries are 
also Parties.62 Unlike in the Kyoto Protocol, Parties agreed that 
the future Durban-based agreement will be “applicable to all 
Parties;” it follows that if the commitments are mandatory and 
specific, they will be mandatory and specific for all countries. 63 
But the possibility remains that the commitments could instead 
be voluntary for all countries. Despite this uncertainty, the launch 
of a new Ad-Hoc Working Group may be ambitiously read as 
Parties’ intent to create new, legally binding commitments under 
the Convention and not replicate the framework established by 
the Cancun Agreements.64
naTIonaL and gLobaL mITIgaTIon commITmenTs
Two important factors that underlie the effectiveness of the 
global response to climate change are: 1) the level of ambition of 
the commitments expressed by countries and 2) the institutions 
and procedures that will ensure transparency and accountability 
around these commitments. The Durban conference delivered 
the detailed rules called for in Cancun, equipping the UNFCCC 
to facilitate action on the part of all countries in a voluntary 
framework.65 These provisions are somewhat helpful in that 
they launch a process to increase ambition and establish insti-
tutions and procedures to coordinate and review the actions of 
countries.66 However, the fact that negotiators delayed decisions 
on several important items is a cause for significant concern.
unCleaR pRospeCts foR bRidging the ambition gap
The pledges made by countries under the Cancun 
Agreements67 are, in aggregate, insufficient to meet the goal of 
limiting a global average temperature increase to two degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels.68 Facing this inadequacy, two 
fundamental questions consequently emerge: what options exist 
for bridging this gap and when will countries consider and adopt 
such options? The Durban decisions provided partial answers to 
these questions.
The acknowledgement of the gap of further GHG reduction 
pledges (“ambition”) in the Durban decisions, and the estab-
lishment of processes to bridge it, may be seen as a reason for 
hope. Paragraph 7 of the Durban Platform decision establishes 
a “workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition” to explore 
options to close the ambition gap.69 Governments and observers 
were invited to submit views about options to increase ambi-
tion, and the UNFCCC Secretariat will organize a workshop 
during the year 2012 to discuss these options.70 In addition, at 
the insistence of the Alliance of Small Island States (“AOSIS”), 
the Cancun Agreements, as confirmed by COP 17 in Durban, 
decided to periodically review the adequacy of the long-term 
goal and aggregate steps taken by Parties to achieving it.71 The 
first such review will begin in 2013 and conclude in 2015, as a 
new agreement under the AWG-DPEA is meant to be adopted.72 
This review thus constitutes an important lever to increase 
ambition over the medium term as it could trigger countries to 
take more ambitious action before 2020 and could determine 
the commitments that countries take post 2020 under the new 
international agreement.73
On a political level, another positive development in Durban 
was the emergence of a new coalition of countries supportive of 
ambition.74 The EU, AOSIS, and the Least Developed Countries 
were most visibly in support of the Durban Package that was 
ultimately adopted.75 This marks an important shift from previous 
years, in particular from the dynamics of Copenhagen, where the 
outcome was largely seen as the result of a deal between the United 
States, China, India, and Brazil.76 The Cancun Agreements, while 
more widely supported, merely vindicated the contents of the 
Copenhagen Accord.77 In Durban, the final outcome of the confer-
ence remained elusive until the very end, in part because the major 
players were still far apart.78 In the final days of the conference, a 
more minimal version of the text emerged with softer language on 
the ambition gap and steps to bridge it.79 It was at this point that 
the EU and the AOSIS allied to push back and instead support a 
text that clearly acknowledged the ambition gap, launched a pro-
cess for bridging it, and set a date for adopting a new international 
agreement that would include all countries.80 Several commenta-
tors attribute the results of the conference to this new alliance, the 
EU in particular.81 It remains to be seen whether this coalition 
can be maintained but, if it is, the alliance could drive the climate 
regime towards increased ambition and a framework that supports 
the interests of pioneering countries, rather than a framework that 
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establishes a lowest common denominator for countries that are 
not ready to lead.
Despite these positive developments, several elements 
suggest that the most difficult political questions were simply 
postponed and that the prospect of meeting the two degree 
Celsius goal is dim. Despite the periodic review to be under-
way in 2013, negotiators were unable to conclude the specific 
scope of negotiations that will be subject to review.82 In addition, 
countries were unable to reach agreement on a global mitigation 
goal or peak year, despite earlier discussion of these topics in 
Copenhagen and Cancun.83 In Durban, negotiators once again 
postponed the decision for consideration at COP 18.84 Further, 
some countries and observers fear that countries will not 
increase the level of ambition of their commitments until 2020, 
when the new agreement will enter into force.85 The adoption of 
a work program for 2012 on options to increase ambition may 
be a sign that such steps could be taken sooner, but the actual 
results remain to be seen given the rapidly closing window for 
meeting the two degree Celsius goal.86
Improved buT InsuFFIcIenT Transparency
On the mitigation front, one of the main achievements of 
the Durban talks was the adoption of guidelines and procedures 
for the regular reporting to the Convention and peer review of 
Parties’ greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation actions, support 
provided, and support received.87 The Copenhagen Accord in 
2010 and COP16 in Cancun in 2011 together mark an important 
shift on the question of measurement, reporting, and verification 
(“MRV”).88 Those agreements established that developed and 
developing countries would produce regular reports that are 
subject to some form of international review.89 In Durban, Parties 
made this new framework operational by adopting modalities for 
reporting and review to be applied to developed and developing 
countries.90 Developed countries will submit their first biennial 
reports by January 2014 and developing countries will submit 
their first biennial update reports by December 2014.91 These 
reports will be subject to a process of “international assessment 
and review” and “international consultations and analysis” for 
developed and developing countries respectively.92
The adequacy of these guidelines can be best assessed based 
on their end goals. First, an MRV framework can help countries 
better understand other countries’ actions and gain confidence 
that all parties are living up to their commitments. Second, 
MRV can provide accountability.93 Regular reporting and review 
of countries’ emissions and actions intend to expose countries 
that are not fulfilling their commitments. In theory, the threat of 
being “named and shamed” provides an incentive to countries 
to comply with their obligations.94 Third, an adequate MRV 
system would generate information that is sufficiently complete 
and comparable to enable an assessment of whether countries, 
in aggregate, are doing enough to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at the levels needed to meet 
global mitigation goals.
However, the Durban decisions provide limited country 
accountability and aggregate accounting in practical terms.95 
The Durban decisions give no explicit right to observers, such as 
nongovernmental organizations and representatives of the media, 
to attend or offer comments or questions during the sessions in 
which the reports of countries are discussed.96 This will likely 
reduce the level of interest among civil society in these reports 
and consequently weaken the “name and shame” effect of the 
process.97 Secondly, the information requested of countries 
in these guidelines is likely to be insufficient to enable an 
accurate assessment of the world’s progress towards the two 
degree Celsius goal. This is due in part to the fact that many 
of the countries’ pledges under the Cancun Agreements have 
special conditions associated with them and leave many assump-
tions unspecified.98 For example, the EU and Australia have 
expressed their pledges as ranges, vowing to commit to the 
higher end of their range only in the context of a comprehensive 
climate agreement.99 China indicated that it would reduce the 
emissions intensity of its economy by forty to fifty percent below 
2005 levels by 2020, but has not specified base year emissions or 
GDP projections for the year 2020.100 Developed countries put 
forward economy-wide emissions targets but, unlike the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Cancun Agreements do not specify in which sectors 
of their economies these countries will reduce emissions.101 The 
United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) estimates 
that this uncertainty surrounding countries’ pledges and the way 
in which they will be implemented will result in an emissions gap 
ranging from six to eleven giga tons CO2 emissions (“GtCO2e”) 
in 2020 compared to what is needed to have a likely chance of 
meeting the two degree goal.102 The Durban decisions do call 
on developed countries to submit additional information about 
their pledges using a standardized template.103 The UNFCCC 
Secretariat will also organize workshops to clarify the pledges 
of countries.104 However, developing countries are not required 
to use a similar template.105 In addition, the Durban decisions 
neither include an agreement on common accounting rules nor 
set up a process to agree to such rules.106 The topic of common 
accounting rules has been hotly debated among negotiators.107 
The EU and the AOSIS in particular have been advocates for 
such rules, whereas the U.S. has resisted these demands.108 
In the end, the division was bridged through a paragraph with 
no real operational effect and which reduces the prospects of 
adoption of common accounting rules in the future.109
Common accounting rules are necessary to ensure that 
countries account for their emissions reductions and enhanced 
removals in a complete and standardized manner. One risk to integ-
rity, for example, is that countries could use different multilateral 
or bilateral offset programs.110 Without common accounting rules 
for these offsets, emission reductions could be counted multiple 
times.111 UNEP estimates that such “double-counting” could result 
in an increase in emissions of up to 1.3 GtCO2e in 2020.112
equITy
Context
The topic of equity has been among the most central and 
contentious in the climate negotiations since the adoption 
of the UNFCCC in 1992.113 The Convention treaty enshrined 
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the notion of equity in Article 3.1 through the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”114 Parties have since been at odds over how to 
interpret this principle.115 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change acknowledged that favoring certain proposals 
over others comes down to “a policy judgment.”116 A major 
source of discord has thus been how to make this widely 
accepted principle operational.117 Academics and policy 
analysts have written extensively on the topic of equity as it 
relates to climate change.118 Until now, the debate has mostly 
centered on the way in which responsibilities for future emissions 
cuts among countries should be allocated.119 Most proposals 
use countries’ capacity and responsibility for past emissions 
(also known as historical responsibility) as a basis for their reduc-
tion recommendations.120The following section examines how 
UNFCCC negotiators at the Durban conference have tackled 
the notion of equity. Though this central issue is one of the keys 
to unlocking other roadblocks, governments have made little 
progress until now on the way in which equity should be inte-
grated into an international agreement.121 The Durban decisions 
offer a window of opportunity to begin a dialogue on this question. 
But statements by negotiators reveal that views are still far apart 
and that much work will be needed to find common ground.
the tReatment of equity in duRban and beyond
Progress on the question of ambition, which this article 
discussed above, will likely be closely tied to progress on the 
question of equity. In the lead-up to the Durban conference, 
the Government of India requested that three items be added 
to the provisional agenda of COP 17, one of which related to 
“equitable access to sustainable development.”122 The submis-
sion states that “[t]he decisions at Cancun imply that the global 
goal of climate stabilization in terms of limiting the temperature 
rise to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels should be 
preceded by a paradigm for equitable access to sustainable 
development.”123 The essence of the Indian position, which 
has received support from other developing countries, is that 
UNFCCC Parties should reach agreement up-front on the way 
in which the future effort to reduce emissions will be allocated 
among countries.124 Many developing countries fear that, with-
out an explicit agreement on the way in which the global “carbon 
budget” will be divided, developing countries will not have 
sufficient flexibility to prioritize their development and poverty 
eradication goals.125 These discussions have become relatively 
contentious because what India and its allies describe as a 
legitimate claim to fairness and development, some developed 
countries view as an effort on the part of the major emerging 
economies to escape the increasing responsibilities that come 
with economic growth and higher greenhouse gas emissions, or 
as a distraction at best.126 In the end, Parties agreed at COP 17 
to hold a workshop in 2012 on the topic of “equitable access to 
sustainable development.”127
In addition, the issue of equity was central to the discus-
sions on the Durban Platform. In a departure from the approach 
taken under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries insisted 
that any future legally binding international agreement should 
include commitments from all countries, or at least the major 
economies, rather than commitments from developed countries 
only.128 The United States, for example, conditioned its accep-
tance of a future legally binding climate agreement on the fact 
that commitments under this agreement should apply symmetri-
cally to developed and developing countries.129 The adoption of 
the decision on the Durban Platform suggests that a balance was 
struck between this demand and the concern expressed by India 
that any future agreement should reflect equity. It is striking that 
the word equity and the principle of “common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities” are absent of 
the decision on the Durban Platform.130 Some commenta-
tors have read this absence as the result of demands by some 
developed countries.131 U.S. Climate Envoy Todd Stern reported 
that he did not want any terms used that could “be read by oth-
ers to perpetuate [...] that firewall.”132 The firewall is a term 
widely used to refer to the traditional sharp distinction under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol between the level 
of responsibility for future action of developed countries and 
developing countries.133
Meanwhile, Indian and Chinese negotiators have offered 
a different interpretation of the Durban Platform decision.134 
They believe that equity actually features in the text of the 
future climate agreement because Paragraph 2 states that the 
new agreement will be “under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. . . .”135 These negotiators argue 
that this phrase ensures that a future agreement will respect the 
principles of the Convention, including the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.136
Future negotiations are therefore likely to focus less on 
whether equity will be a part of the future climate agreement, 
and more on how the principle of equity should be integrated 
in this agreement. Importantly, symmetry and equity are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. There are ways to integrate the 
principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
equity into a legally binding agreement that includes mandatory 
commitments for all Parties. The U.S., for example, has argued 
that the content of future commitments could differ between 
developed and developing countries, as long as their legal 
character is identical.137 Developed countries could commit to 
absolute economy-wide reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, 
while developing countries could commit to reducing emissions 
compared to a business as usual scenario or could commit to 
implementing certain climate policies. The way forward may 
therefore lie in identifying ways in which symmetry and equity 
can be made compatible. Better trust and understanding on 
equity are necessary to inform and ultimately adopt countries’ 
individual and collective mitigation commitments post 2020.
These examples show that the issue of equity will certainly 
remain central to the climate negotiations in the months and 
years to come. The Durban decisions, through carefully worded 
compromises, have postponed political decisions on equity 
that, however difficult, are necessary to make progress on other 
critical issues, including ambition. The silver lining may be the 
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workshop on equity called for under the Durban decisions. It has 
the potential to start an overdue dialogue on options for integrating 
equity in an international agreement on climate change in a way 
that reconciles Parties’ varied needs and aspirations, as well as 
global mitigation goals.
concLusIon
What did the Durban climate talks deliver? The examples 
reviewed in this article show that, on the most fundamental 
issues that will determine the effectiveness of global efforts to 
address climate change, the record is mixed. Parties did manage 
to achieve some incremental progress, at times defying the odds, 
which could signal a shift in the climate regime towards greater 
ambition.138 But several of the delicate compromises struck on 
legal form, national and global mitigation commitments, and 
equity did not bridge cleavages on the most sensitive and funda-
mental political questions.139
To those who have followed the UNFCCC negotiations for 
some time, this diagnostic is familiar because it is reminiscent 
of previous meetings of the COP and CMP.140 This result is also 
perhaps natural. After all, climate change is one of the most 
difficult environmental, economic and social issues of our time 
and the ongoing negotiations and deals serve to incrementally 
build a coordinated global response to this threat.141 However, 
time is of the essence.142 Further delays risk thwarting our 
ability to reach the stated two-degree Celsius goal.143
In conclusion, one may reflect on the causes and possible 
remedies for this misalignment between the urgency of the prob-
lem and the slow, limited, and incremental solutions that the 
international climate negotiations have been able to deliver until 
now. The problem can be seen as one of misalignment of politics 
and expectations. While the UNFCCC has long been seen as the 
main – and sometimes only – legitimate international body for 
dealing with climate change, the time may have come to redefine 
the roles of various actors in the broader climate regime.144 This 
calls for focusing the UNFCCC on the essential functions it is 
best placed to fulfill. It also calls for catalyzing and assigning 
responsibility to other international initiatives, national govern-
ments, and local actors to play their part.
Climate change, despite its global dimensions, requires 
action at the national and sub-national level.145 Critics of the 
UNFCCC will use this fact to argue that a bottom-up regime 
will create greater incentives for action. But rather than dis-
count the UNFCCC, one should define a catalytic role for it. 
The UNFCCC arguably remains best placed to fulfill certain 
fundamental functions. This may include setting international 
goals, tracking the individual and aggregate performance of 
countries to stay on track with those goals, balancing country 
interests in an equitable manner, and providing a legal frame-
work that generates confidence that all countries will implement 
their commitments.146 With regard to these functions, some of 
the outcomes of Durban were meaningful. The Durban decisions 
create a new window of opportunity for increasing ambition and 
securing a meaningful commitment to collective action in 2015 
in a new international agreement.147
But it is true that the UNFCCC alone cannot deliver the level 
of global action needed. Efforts to generate greater ambition 
will be successful only if actions are taken to generate political 
support at the domestic level.148 In many ways, the resolve of 
ministers and negotiators at the UNFCCC is a reflection of 
domestic political will. Issues such as national commitments 
to mitigation and public climate finance are driven by national 
political and economic agendas rather than international 
bargaining among governments.149 The development and 
deployment of low-carbon technology also depends on the coop-
eration of many actors outside the U.N., including the private 
sector.150 While the UNFCCC can inform, reflect, measure, 
and coordinate the actions of countries, the level of ambition of 
these actions and the adequacy of the new agreement that will 
be adopted in 2015 will be in large part determined by our abil-
ity to generate domestic political support for climate action.151 
Domestic and international institutions need to act in tandem 
and reinforce each other over time.
Other international initiatives can also complement 
the UNFCCC, including the United Nations Convention on 
Sustainable Development (“Rio + 20 Summit”), the World 
Trade Organization, the G20, the Montreal Protocol, the 
International Maritime Organization, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, and bilateral initiatives.152 Here again, 
the objective would not be to seek alternatives to the UNFCCC 
but to think more strategically about the defined roles that the 
UNFCCC, other international organizations, national govern-
ments, and sub-national actors can play to collectively achieve 
our common goal. The Durban conference opened a narrow 
window of opportunity for increasing ambition in time to meet 
the two degree goal. Unless we mobilize domestic constituencies 
and international institutions to generate sufficient political will, 
the odds are high that future climate meetings will be unable to 
unlock the ambiguities that persisted in Durban and we will miss 
our target goal.
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